We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is "smoother" in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. Unlike in the study by Pérez Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) , the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired.
Introduction

Contribution
The design of mechanisms that help agents reach decisions on contentious issues is a very relevant and active line of research. A mechanism that leads to an efficient project requires information about agents' preferences for each possible decision. The multibidding mechanism, proposed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) allows the agents to express their relative preference for projects. It proceeds as follows. Each agent submits a vector of bids, one for each project, with the sole restriction that the sum of each agent's bids is zero. Therefore, bids measure relative rather than absolute valuation. Each agent also nominates one of the projects specifically. The project with the highest aggregate bid (sum of bids made for this project) is chosen. In case there is more than one such project, there is a rule that gives priority to projects that have been nominated by some agent. The winning project is carried out, agents pay the promised bid corresponding to this project, and any surplus is shared among the agents, so that the mechanism is budget-balanced.
The main property of the multibidding mechanism is that all its Nash (and strong Nash) equilibrium outcomes are efficient. However, in general environments, the mechanism has two weak aspects that we address in the current paper. First, it requires the tiebreaking rule that, at equilibrium, is always used because all projects' equilibrium aggregate bids are zero. Therefore, the tiebreaking rule plays a crucial role. As Ehlers (2009) highlights, removing the agents' abilities to nominate one specific project and using tiebreaking rules may prevent an equilibrium from existing. Because agents do not nominate a specific project in many real-world processes such as auctions, this lack of robustness constitutes a weakness of the initial mechanism. Second, the set of equilibrium outcomes is quite large, as it consists of all the outcomes where each agent's payoff is at least the expected payoff he would obtain in a situation where all the projects have the same probability of being developed. Therefore, almost any ("reasonable") sharing of the surplus is an equilibrium outcome.
In the present paper, we tackle the issues highlighted above by proposing a smooth multibidding mechanism. It is close to the original proposal but ours is "smoother" in the sense that small variations of an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. In the smooth mechanism, each agent only submits a vector of bids, without nominating any project. All projects can be selected, with each project's probability being a function of its aggregate bid as well as the aggregate bids of the rest of the projects. Projects with a negative aggregate bid have a very low, but positive, fixed probability of being selected (a function of some parameter ). Each project with a positive aggregate bid is selected with a probability that is a function of the level of its (and others') positive aggregate bid.
We first show that, for a given value of , the equilibrium outcome is unique. This property is important because it highlights that there is no coordination issue with respect to agents' expectation about the final outcome. We then characterize the equilibrium outcome. Although there may be several equilibrium strategies, the differences among them only concern bids for those projects that, at equilibrium, end up with negative aggregate bids. We identify the set of projects with positive equilibrium bids as well as each agent's bids to any project in this set. Only projects that are efficient, or whose total valuation is very close to the efficient one, ultimately receive a positive aggregate bid. In case some non-efficient project receives a positive aggregate bid, its level reflects the degree of inefficiency.
Second, the smooth multibidding mechanism ensures a fair share of the surplus that it induces. Indeed, an agent's equilibrium payoff in the mechanism is the sum of the value of the average project plus his fair share of the remaining surplus. That is, agents obtain the same level of utility as in the original multibidding mechanism, and the surplus is divided in equal parts among the agents. This fairness property ensures that the mechanism is politically feasible, which is an important characteristic for practical implementation.
Third, the mechanism does not rely on the use of tiebreaking rules and is immune to the criticism raised by Ehlers (2009) . It can be thus thought of as a more natural mechanism than the initial one.
Finally, it is apparent from the previous description that the smooth multibidding mechanism does not achieve efficiency. It does, however, get as close to efficiency as one wishes. We show that each agent's expected payoff increases as the value of the parameter  decreases; therefore, total efficiency increases as well. Moreover, the probability of choosing an inefficient project converges to zero as the value of the parameter  becomes small. We can bound the level of expected inefficiency as a function of the parameter :
the maximum level of inefficiency of a project that receives a positive aggregate bid is a linear function of the square root of .
To summarize, the present mechanism exhibits the interesting properties of uniqueness and fairness of its equilibrium outcome. The weakness compared to the initial mechanism (which guarantees full efficiency) is only minor as a social planner relying on the new protocol would be able to get as close to full efficiency as she wishes. Therefore, this mechanism constitutes an interesting option for practical implementations.
Applicability of the mechanism and related literature
There are many economic situations where this mechanism can be successfully used. A first case concerns the complex problem of the location of noxious facilities, such as prisons, dump sites, nuclear waste repositories, or airports. Many authors address this type of problem; we can refer among other papers to Kunreuther and Kleindorfer, 1986; Rob, However, this is a very difficult decision that involves many scientific, economic, and social issues. For each project, supporting countries should work out a procedure to choose the host of the facility. Therefore, they must first decide on a mechanism and then use the procedure to elect the hosting city.
The previous examples belong to a general class of problems in which a group of agents has to choose one out of several projects. In some situations, the set of projects coincides with the set of agents, as is the case if a group of municipalities meet to choose one of them to host a dump site or a hospital. In another context, the set of agents is larger than the set of projects, as is typically the case when countries or institutions build a large international research infrastructure: in such a situation, all countries may not have an own proposal regarding the specifics of the project to be carried out. The main objective of a mechanism in such situations would be to maximize the aggregate welfare of all the agents (efficiency). Moreover, such decisions typically require to compensate (some) agents with monetary transfers. The protocol defined in the present contribution can be considered a valuable option to be considered.
We have highlighted our contribution to the literature that offers mechanisms to decide the location of noxious facilities or any other joint decision by a group of agents. Our proposal is also related to papers that look for mechanisms that agents can use to choose whether to develop a project and which one to develop (see, for instance, Moulin, 1984, and Jackson and Moulin, 1992) ; to reach good allocations in economic environments with public goods and externalities (Varian, 1994a and 1994b) ; to dissolve a partnership (McAfee, 1992) ; to sell (or not) a project to one agent when it affects many (Jehiel et al., 1996) ; or to award an indivisible good to one agent (in the spirit of King Solomon's dilemma; see, for instance, Glazer and Ma, 1989 , and Perry and Reny, 1999). Finally, our paper can also be related to the literature on virtual (or −) implementation (Matsushima, 1988, and Abreu and Sen, 1991) in the sense that our objective is not to achieve an exact implementation of an efficient and fair outcome but to get as "close" as wished to that allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the environment and the smooth multibidding mechanism. The equilibrium strategies and outcome are stated in Section 3. Section 4 studies the main properties of the equilibrium outcome, including the convergence properties when the parameter  goes to zero. We provide a simple example in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are included in the Appendix.
The environment and the mechanism
We consider a set of agents  = {1     } which have to choose which project will be carried out of a set of possible projects
We denote by  the set of efficient projects, that is,
Information about all the values    is complete among the agents; that is, each agent knows not only the value he assigns to the projects but also the values assigned by the other agents. However, the planner does not have information about these values.
Alternatively, even if she did have some information, she would not want to use it. The planner is interested in designing an impartial mechanism that will treat all the agents in a symmetric manner.
We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism through which agents influence the probability that projects are selected. We now describe the mechanism, which has a unique stage.
Each agent  ∈  makes a vector of bids
All agents make their decision simultaneously. Once the agents have chosen their bids, the outcome of the smooth multibidding mechanism is the following.
For each  ∈ ,   ≡ P ∈    denotes the aggregate bid for project  and  ≡ (  ) ∈ denotes the vector of aggregate bids. The probability that project  be carried out if the vector of aggregate bids is  is
where we consider the following function ():
Finally, if project  is chosen, each agent  ∈  pays his bid for that project,    , and he receives a fair share of the aggregate bid,   . Therefore, agent 's utility if project  is implemented is
The smooth multibidding mechanism borrows from the multibbiding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) the idea of allowing the agents to express their relative preference for projects through a vector of bids. However, under the original mechanism, the probability of selecting any project abruptly jumps from 0 to 1 as the aggregate bid for this project just passes the maximum aggregate bid for the other projects. Under our proposal, a higher (positive) aggregate bid for a project increases the probability that it is selected, but the increase is "smooth". This feature allows us to offer a mechanism that does not require ad hoc tiebreaking rules.
3 The equilibria of the smooth multibidding mechanism
In this section, we characterize the Nash equilibria (NE) of the smooth multibidding mechanism. We proceed as follows. First, we derive several properties that are necessarily satisfied by NE of the game. Second, we use these properties to provide a characterization of the set of NE.
Let us proceed now with the analysis. Consider a vector of agents' bids (  ) ∈ and let  denote the set of projects for which the aggregate bid is positive under this vector of strategies, that is,  ≡ { ∈    0}. Similarly, denote by  ≡ { ∈    0} and  ≡ { ∈   = 0} so we have  ∪  = \. Additionally, we denote  the number of projects in . 2 The probability that project  ∈  is chosen is given by
Agent  chooses his vector of bids   to maximize his expected profits given the bids chosen by the rest of the agents. Agent 's profits are
Therefore, agent  chooses   to solve the following program, which we denote by [  ]:
To proceed with our analysis we note first, 
where we have taken into account that
It is worthwhile to notice that   () is the same for all  ∈ , which supports the following property:
increasing agent 's bid to a project in  and decreasing another of this agent's bids to a different project in  does not matter, as long as both projects still receive a negative aggregate bid after the changes.
The FOC for any  ∈  is
where
Finally, for any  ∈ , it needs to be the case that (it holds with equality). Therefore, we only have to add the following condition:
for any  ∈  where
and
is given by (4) for any  ∈ , and it is given by (5) for any  ∈ \( ∪ ).
The previous FOCs are necessary (although not sufficient) to characterize the NE of the proposed mechanism given that any equilibirum must be interior.
Next, we use the FOCs of each agent's program to characterize the set  and the NE aggregate and individual bids to these projects. Lemma 1 conveys useful information about the equilibrium aggregate bids for the projects in .
Lemma 1 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, if   0 ∈  then
Lemma 1 implies that differences in bids among those projects that receive positive aggregate bids directly reflect the differences in total values of the projects.
We now use the previous result and the FOCs to characterize the aggregate bid received by any project in .
Proposition 1 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, if  ∈  then   satisfies (  ) = 0, where
We notice that the concave function () starts (at   = 0) at a positive value only if   is close enough to the valuation of the projects in  that is, if   is high enough. The derivative of () also depends on   : it is larger when   is larger. This derivative  0 ()
can be positive or negative at   = 0, depending on   and it converges to −∞ as   becomes very large. Therefore, () always crosses (once) the horizontal axis if it starts with a positive value. We also prove in the Appendix that it never crosses the horizontal axis if () starts at a negative value.
Before we continue the characterization of the equilibrium agents' bids, we turn to the analysis of the set , that is, the set of projects that receive positive aggregate bid.
Lemma 1 showed that, for projects in , aggregate bids increase with total valuation.
The same logic suggests that any project in  should have higher total valuation than any project outside  (as they receive non-positive aggregate bids). Lemma 2 shows that this intuition is indeed correct.
Lemma 2 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, if project  satisfies   ≥   for some  ∈ , then  ∈ .
We can now provide a simple condition to check whether a project receives, at equilibrium, a positive aggregate bid. That is, Proposition 2 characterizes the set of projects .
Proposition 2 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism,  ∈  if and only if the following condition holds:
The above result enables to conclude that the valuation of any particular project in
 cannot be too far from that of projects whose total valuation is higher. Only projects whose total valuation is higher than the average valuation can be in  (otherwise, the left-hand side of equation (10) is negative). Moreover, for a "better-than-average" project to be in , it is also necessary that the sum of the differences (to the power 2) between the value of this project and the value of the projects that are more efficient should be small enough. In particular, only efficient projects will receive positive (aggregate) bids in situations where the difference between the total values of any efficient project and the least inefficient project is sufficiently large. Finally, the set  only contains efficient projects if the parameter  is small enough.
Proposition 2 characterizes the set of projects  whose equilibrium aggregate bids satisfy (  ) = 0. Additionally, taking into account condition (10) (1)) is that any switch in agents' strategy concerning bids to projects outside  is irrelevant, as long as the set  is not changed. Therefore, we already have the main information concerning the characteristics of the NE strategies of the smooth multibbiding mechanism. Theorem 1 provides the full description of the equilibria through a complete characterization of the equilibrium bids.
Theorem 1
The set of bids (  ) ∈ , with P ∈    = 0 for all  ∈ , constitutes a NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
There is an intuitive progression from the first to the last property in the above theorem. Property () provides a way to check which projects will receive positive bids.
Property () then characterizes the aggregate bids of such projects. Property () uses () to characterize the corresponding individual bids. Finally, property () follows from () and provides a lower bound on the individual bids for projects whose aggregate bid is non positive.
There are three important remarks regarding the last property. First, property () prevents any agent from having incentives to increase his bid for a project whose aggregate bid is non positive. Second, the statement of this property is actually independent from the specific choice of project  ∈  since the difference
this choice. Third, property () is stronger that the FOC (6) as it concerns not only projects in  but also in . Therefore, not all strategies that satisfy the FOCs constitute a NE.
Theorem 1 enables us to construct a particular vector of bids that satisfy conditions () and (), which also shows that the set of  of the smooth multibidding mechanism is always non empty:
The set of  of the smooth multibidding mechanism is non empty. In particular, the following set of bids (  ) ∈ is a :
 is constructed using () and (), for all  ∈ , where  is the non-empty set that satisfies condition ();
, where  is a particular element of \;
Therefore, we have an easy way to construct a  for any environment. The proof of Proposition 3 only requires that condition () is also satisfied for the particular project
The characterization of equilibrium bids is an important point of the analysis, but we have little information on the practical properties satisfied by the mechanism (in terms of equilibrium payoffs, degree of efficiency). These properties will be provided in the next section.
Properties of the smooth multibidding mechanism
In the present section we provide several properties satisfied by the equilibrium outcome of the proposed mechanism. First, we highlight that each agent's equilibrium payoff satisfies a fairness property. Second, we show that the optimal payoffs resulting from the mechanism increase monotonically as the value of the parameter  decreases. Third, we provide an upper bound on the degree of potential inefficiency that could arise in a project in the set , and we prove that the mechanism converges to full efficiency as the value of the parameter  becomes small.
Fairness of equilibrium payoffs
We start with the characterization of the agents' equilibrium payoffs.
Proposition 4
In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, agent 's profits are
The above equality highlights that an agent's equilibrium payoff is made of two parts.
The first part amounts to the value of the average project,
This would correspond to the payoff associated with the random assignment mechanism, that is, a mechanism that would choose any project with the same probability. We notice that this mechanism is a benchmark that is used often in practical situations. It basically corresponds to a process where agents would "throw a die" to determinate which specific project would be implemented in case they would be indifferent between all the potential projects. It is also the utility level that each agent can secure himself when he plays the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002). The second part of the equilibrium payoff is the fair share of the surplus. Therefore, not only is the equilibrium payoff of the smooth multibidding mechanism unique (in contrast with the multibidding mechanism, whose outcome set can be large) but it also implies a fair share of the surplus (i.e., the additional payoff obtained with respect of the average value of the projects).
One implication of Proposition 4 is that agents' interests are aligned: when one agent's payoff increases, the payoffs of the other agents also increase. Therefore, there is no conflict between total profits and individual profits.
Monotonicity of equilibrium payoffs
The characterization of the agents' expected payoffs obtained in the previous sub-section is also useful because it enables us to check whether the parameter  has a monotone effect on the optimal payoffs. Intuitively, one would think that payoffs should increase with a decrease in the value of the parameter. This is confirmed by the next result.
Proposition 5 Any agent's optimal expected profits increase with a decrease in the value of the parameter .
A smaller value of  leads to a higher efficiency level attained by the mechanism and each agent having higher expected payoffs. This provides a clear implication for a practical implementation of the mechanism: the value of the parameter  should be positive and chosen as small as possible, as this would ensure that the agents' expected payoffs will come close to their highest possible values.
It is important to notice that we have not yet proved that choosing the parameter  as small as possible would ensure that the mechanism comes as close as possible to full efficiency. This will be proved in the final sub-section, where we first highlight two additional properties.
Convergence of the mechanism to full efficiency
Before analyzing the convergence of the outcome of the mechanism to full efficiency, it is interesting to characterize the degree of inefficiency that can be sustained in projects with positive equilibrium aggregate bids. The next result provides an upper bound on this degree of inefficiency.
Proposition 6
In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, for any  ∈ , the following inequality holds:
where  * denotes the value of an efficient project.
Proposition 6 implies that the potential degree of inefficiency of any project with
positive aggregate bid at equilibrium is a linear function of the square root of . Therefore, the mechanism will only select efficient projects for situations where the degree of heterogeneity in the value of the projects is sufficiently large. As soon as the difference between the value of an efficient project   and that of a second-best project   is large enough, then the mechanism will select efficient projects only. Moreover, as the value of the parameter  becomes arbitrarily small the degree of heterogeneity required converges to zero. Therefore, small values of  will ensure that the outcome implemented by the mechanism approximates full efficiency. This is consistent with the conclusion resulting from the monotonicity of the agents' expected payoffs as described in Proposition 5.
Next, we provide additional information on the agents' optimal bids when all selected projects are efficient. In such a situation, the optimal aggregate bids can be easily characterized, as highlighted by the following result.
Proposition 7
In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, if  =  then
for any  ∈ . Moreover,   converges to 0 and   () converges to 1 as  tends towards
0.
When only efficient projects are selected by the mechanism, the form of the aggregate bids is simple. According to this expression, the aggregate bid will be higher as the difference between the value of an efficient project and those of the other projects increases.
Moreover, all efficient projects will be selected with equal probability approximately equal to 1  as the parameter  becomes arbitrarily small. In particular, the probability that an efficient project is selected converges to 1 as  tends toward 0.
Propositions 6 and 7 enable us to provide a final result on the relative efficiency of the mechanism as the value of the parameter  becomes small. Specifically, we show that, for any equilibrium, the probability of implementing an inefficient project converges to zero. Therefore, the outcome of the mechanism gets as close to efficiency as one wishes as the parameter  tends towards zero.
Proposition 8
The outcome of the smooth multibidding mechanism converges to full efficiency as the parameter  converges to zero. In other words, if project  ∈  denotes an inefficient project, its probability to be implemented at the equilibrium converges to zero as  becomes small.
The above result confirms that the effect of a variation of the parameter  is intuitive.
Regarding the actual implementation of the mechanism, small values of this parameter will ensure that the chance of choosing an inefficient project comes close to zero.
Example
Before concluding the paper, it might be useful to highlight the main properties of the mechanism with a simple example. Let us consider the following situation.
Two agents (1 and 2) have to make a collective decision on the implementation of a project. There are four potential choices corresponding to the set  = {1 2 3 4} where the agents' benefits are:  At equilibrium of the smooth multibidding mechanism, Project 3 will receive a negative aggregate bid for any possible  (this follows from Theorem 1 (a)). Project 1 will also receive negative aggregate bid as soon as   12. In this case, Proposition 7 provides the expression for the aggregate bids of projects 2 and 4 (the efficient projects):
and Theorem 1 (c) enables one to find the equilibrium individual bids for projects 1 and 2. For example, the bids that agents submit for project 2 are
The probability that projects 2 and 4 are selected at equilibrium is
therefore, each  2 () and  4 () converges to 12 as  converges to zero.
Finally, regarding the agents' equilibrium payoffs, we know from Proposition 4 that, for instance, agent 1's payoff is given by the following expressions:
# which corresponds to this agent's value of the average project (5) plus his fair share of the collective benefits. The collective benefits converge towards the total value 10 of an efficient project minus the total value of the average project 8. Therefore, Π 1 converges to 6 as  converges to 0.
Conclusion
Relying on the main characteristics of the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002), we developed a new procedure for choosing efficient projects in situations where the social planner does not have information on the agents' preferences.
Even though the present protocol does not achieve efficiency, it has a number of interesting properties compared to the mechanism developed in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) . That is, it implements a unique equilibrium outcome, satisfies a fairness property and is immune to the problems highlighted by Ehlers (2009) as the use of tiebreaking rules is avoided (by making the probability to select a given project continuous). Moreover, it may come as close to full efficiency as the social planner wishes.
As uniqueness and fairness of the resulting outcome are important properties for practical implementation (among other things, fairness ensures that the mechanism will be politically feasible), this mechanism may be considered a valuable tool for such problems of collective decision making.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume  contains at least two projects, otherwise the lemma holds trivially. The derivative of the payoff to any agent , when adding an infinitesimal
The previous derivative must be zero at the optimum, that is,
which is equivalent to (8).
Proof of Proposition 1. The FOC for any  ∈  implies  =
. Therefore, we write the FOC with respect to  ∈  (equation (2)) as (after easy simplifications)
i.e.,
Note that we can write the last two terms in (14) as
where we have used equation (8) . Therefore, (14) can be written as (  ) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, suppose \ contains at least two projects. Take projects  ∈ \ and  ∈  satisfying   ≥   . We know that for any agent  ∈ , changes in ¡  
The previous derivative can not be positive at the optimum, that is,
Summing the previous equation over , we get
( 1 5 ) However, the last inequality cannot hold if   ≥   and    0
Second, suppose \ = {} and pick  such that   is the lowest among the elements
Therefore,    0 is not possible.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first prove by contradiction that project  does not belong to  if (10) does not hold. We know that, according to Lemma 2,
Denote by  the project in  with the lowest total valuation:
0 implies that (  )  0 for all positive   . However, this is not possible at equilibrium.
Second, we prove that (10) does not hold if  ∈ \. Note that (10) cannot happen for  if {} = \. Therefore, we take  ∈ \ and and suppose that there are at least two projects outside . Consider some  ∈ . By the same calculations as in the proof of Lemma 2, we obtain (see (15) 
 , the previous inequality is equivalent to
Given that   ⊃  for any   ∈ , it is necessarily the case that equation (10) cannot hold, as we wanted to prove.
Proof of Theorem 1. The necessity of parts () and () comes from propositions 1 and 2. For part (), note that from (11), we know that
for any   ∈ . Therefore, we can write (12) as
We use (8) to show that
and, using that (  ) = 0, we obtain
and part () follows. For part (), from the same calculations as in the proof of Lemma 3, it follows that, for any agent , any project  ∈  and any  ∈  we have
as agents do not have incentives to deviate. This implies the following inequality:
Using () and rewriting, we check that part () follows for any  ∈ . Part () is also implied by () for any  ∈  when \ is a singleton, \ = {}, using 
Finally, when \ contains at least two projects, any agent can unilaterally amend his bids regarding the projects in  to make any project with an initially negative aggregate bid get one equal to zero. Moreover, the resulting situation is payoff equivalent to the initial one. This implies that condition (19) must hold for all projects  ∈  once we
We now show that () to () are also sufficient conditions for NE. Consider any vector of bids (  ) ∈ satisfying () to (). We will prove that (  ) ∈ is indeed a NE by showing that   is a best response to  − .
Any best response   to  − must satisfy the FOCs. We denote by
for any  ∈  and by ,  the set and number corresponding to the vector of bids
. Following the same calculations as in the proof of Lemma 1, FOCs imply
Also, when \ has at least two elements, calculations similar to those in Lemma 2 imply
When \ only contains one element, that is, \ = {} for some  ∈ , then (21) also holds as it is implied by (20) . Indeed, summing (20) over  ∈ \ and taking into account that 
that is,
Therefore, (21) holds if
3 Therefore, (21) also holds for  when \ = {}. Now, we take any  0 ∈  and rewrite (20) and (21) as
3 Any best response   must ensure expected profits higher or equal than
, which is the level that agent  can secure with the "safe" strategy 
Therefore, all the projects  ∈  must provide this level of profits in case they are chosen; otherwise, agent  would decrease all the bids on those projects which provide less profits (he would also increase    , still ensuring that   is negative); this would increase the probability of success of those projects whose profits in case there are chosen is higher or equal than
Equation (23) is a necessary condition for  to be in \. Similarly, because   is positive if  ∈ , a necessary condition for  to be in  is (following (22))
Therefore, if  0 ∈ , then  ∈  if and only if (24) holds. Equation (24) implies that if
 is larger than some threshold. Also notice that this is also necessarily true for the set  (possibly with a different threshold). Therefore, either
We go back to (20) , which we rewrite as (25)
Taking into account that (25) also holds for
that is,    =    +  (and also   =   + ), for some  ∈ R, for all  ∈  ∩ . Take some  ∈ . The FOC with respect to    is (see (13) 
First, suppose that  ≤ 0 Then, (24) is more limiting for   than for   ; therefore,  ⊂ .
Equation (27) becomes
which we write as Ã
The sum of the first three terms in (28) is equal to zero, as it corresponds to the FOC of   . Then after some calculations, (28) becomes
We notice that because of condition (),
for any   ∈  (in particular, this is also true if   ∈ ). Moreover, Lemma 1 implies
Therefore, (29) can be written as
The first term in (30) is non-negative; in fact, it is zero if and only if \ is empty.
Moreover,  + 2 + 2 P ∈   is positive. Taking into account that  ≤ 0, (29) only holds if \ is empty, that is,  =  and  = 0.
Second, suppose that  ≥ 0, which implies (following (24) ) that  ⊃ . We take  ∈  and we rewrite (27) :
which, because  ∈ , and after following steps similar to those in the first case, gives
Using (20), we deduce that the first term is equal to
Therefore, taking into account that  ≥ 0, (32) only holds if  =  and  = 0.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that
which, after easy calculations, gives
Notice that the previous inequality is independent of  and holds if   −  −( − 1)   ≥ 0 for all  ∈ \ (as   ≤ 0 for  ∈ \), that is, if  ³ 1 (−1) (  −   )´≤ 0 (where we take the function () corresponding to project ). Therefore, (33) holds if equation (16) is satisfied. In the proof of Proposition 2 we have shown that (16) is equivalent to (17) :
Equation (17) holds for the project with the highest   among the projects in \, as, for (17) is equivalent to the condition that  does not belong to . Additionally,   −   − ( − 1)   ≥ 0 as well for the other projects whose   is smaller. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Denote
the probability that any of the projects outside  is selected. Using Theorem 1, we derive:
which, after simplification, is the expression in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. Given Proposition 4, Proposition 5 is equivalent to the property that the function  () ≡ P ∈   ((); )  is decreasing with . We rewrite the continuously differentiable function  () as
We deduce that  0  () is the same for any  ∈  from Lemma 1, and we denote such a derivative by  0 (). Then the sign of  0 () is the same as that of the following expression:
which, after some easy calculations, can be written as
We now analyze the sign of the four elements of (). Then, by Proposition 6 we deduce that project  does not belong to  for the above values of the parameter , which implies that any inefficient project is in \ as well.
Therefore, for small enough values of ,  =  and, according to Proposition 7, the probability of selecting an efficient project converges to 1 as the parameter  tends to zero, which ensures convergence to an efficient outcome as  tends to zero.
